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ABSTRACT 
 
KATIE E. MCDERMOTT: Financial Reporting Quality and Investment in Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman) 
 
 
This study investigates the role of financial reporting quality in disciplining managers’ 
investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR). While agency problems are endemic to 
all investment decisions, with respect to investment in CSR, the moral hazard problem that 
results in over-investment is likely exacerbated as CSR provides certain private benefits to 
managers that would not be expected from a typical investment. Consistent with higher-
quality financial reporting reducing over-investment in CSR, I document a negative 
association between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR for firms operating in 
settings with higher likelihood of over-investment. Further, I show that there is a positive 
relation between investment in CSR and future profitability for firms with high-quality 
financial reporting whereas there is a negative relation between investment in CSR and future 
profitability for firms with low-quality financial reporting. Overall, these results suggest that 
higher-quality financial reporting improves CSR investment efficiency by mitigating moral 
hazard, resulting in an investment in CSR that benefits shareholders by improving future 
financial performance. 
 
iii 
 
To Mom and Dad
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions from my dissertation committee, Robert 
Bushman (Chair), Jeff Abarbanell, Wayne Landsman, Mark Lang, and Ed Maydew, as well 
as those from Dan Amiram, Elicia Cowins, John Gallemore, Justin Hopkins, Sangwan Kim, 
Eva Labro, and Mark Maffett. I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Royster Society of 
Fellows Lovick P. Corn Dissertation Fellowship. All errors are my own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... vi 
 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY AND INVESTMENT IN 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................. 1 
 
Introduction  .................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Background and Hypothesis Development ...................................................................... 6 
 
Data and Sample Selection ............................................................................................ 13 
 
Research Design ............................................................................................................ 15 
 
Empirical Results .......................................................................................................... 23 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 30 
 
Appendix A. Variable Definitions ................................................................................. 39 
 
Appendix B. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Performance................................. 40 
 
Appendix C. Monte Carlo randomization test methodology ........................................... 41 
 
Appendix D. Interaction Effects in Probit Model ........................................................... 43 
 
References ..................................................................................................................... 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
 
1. Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 32 
 
2. Correlations .................................................................................................... 33 
 
3. Determinants of investment in CSR ................................................................ 34 
 
4. Relation between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR ............... 35 
 
5. Relation between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR ............... 36 
 
6. Investment in CSR and future financial performance....................................... 37 
 
7. Investment in CSR and future financial performance....................................... 38 
   
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY AND 
INVESTMENT IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 In recent years, there has been an increased focus on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).1 CSR has been critiqued by Milton Friedman and others, who argue that the 
responsibility of a corporation is to earn profits and that CSR is a distribution of shareholder 
wealth for pursuit of managers’ own interests (Friedman, 1970). On the other side of the CSR 
debate, some theoretical models and empirical findings indicate that CSR can be an 
economically justified business expenditure that enhances a firm’s future financial 
performance (e.g., Fisman et al., 2006; Lev et al., 2009) or reduces a firm’s cost of capital 
(e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). In this study, I explore the role of financial 
reporting quality in disciplining managers’ investments in CSR, as this is one channel that is 
likely to affect whether CSR results in enhanced financial performance. Specifically, I 
examine whether higher-quality financial reporting is associated with a reduction in over-
investment in CSR and whether higher-quality financial reporting results in CSR investments 
that enhance financial performance. I provide evidence that higher-quality financial reporting 
reduces over-investment in CSR and results in CSR investments that are positively associated 
with future profitability. Overall, these results suggest that higher-quality financial reporting
                                                             
1 Consistent with prior research, including Renneboog et al. (2008), I define corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) as a set of corporate decisions fostering social, environmental, and ethical issues. 
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 improves CSR investment efficiency and disciplines managers to make investments in CSR 
that benefit shareholders. 
 Agency theory describes the conflict between managers and shareholders that arises 
when managers choose actions that are not in the best interest of shareholders in order to 
maximize their own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This moral hazard problem is 
caused by the existence of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and 
can result in managers choosing investments with negative net present value. Agency 
perspectives on CSR, including the Friedman critique, argue that absent strong control from 
shareholders, managers can opportunistically use corporate resources to pursue goals that 
enhance their own utility in ways that are unlikely to provide significant returns to 
shareholders. Consequently, CSR comes at the expense of good financial performance 
because CSR makes use of firm resources in ways that confer significant managerial benefits 
rather than devoting those resources to alternative investment projects or returning them to 
shareholders (Brammer and Millington, 2008). As investments in CSR can provide certain 
private benefits to managers that would not be expected from a typical investment (e.g., 
reputational gains, enhanced social status, or a “warm-glow” from supporting a social cause), 
the moral hazard problem that results in over-investment is likely exacerbated with respect to 
investments in CSR. 
 Prior research suggests that higher-quality financial reporting can mitigate the moral 
hazard problem that results in inefficient investment decisions.2 For example, Bushman and 
Smith (2001) document that financial accounting information influences firms’ future 
                                                             
2 Conceptually, I follow Biddle et al. (2009) and define a firm as investing efficiently if it undertakes projects 
with positive net present value and define a firm as over-investing if it undertakes projects with negative net 
present value. 
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economic performance through a governance role and predict that higher-quality financial 
accounting information improves investment efficiency. Consistent with this prediction, 
Biddle et al. (2009) find that higher-quality financial reporting improves investment 
efficiency by reducing over- and under- investment. In this study, I examine whether higher-
quality financial reporting disciplines managers’ investments in CSR. With respect to CSR, 
higher-quality financial reporting may mitigate the exacerbated moral hazard problem by 
decreasing information asymmetry and increasing the ability of shareholders to monitor 
managers’ investments in CSR through the use of high-quality, firm-specific information. 
Thus, I examine whether higher-quality financial reporting results in increased CSR 
investment efficiency. 
 To examine whether financial reporting quality disciplines managers’ investments in 
CSR, I use proxies for the key constructs in the analysis, financial reporting quality and 
investment in CSR. To construct a proxy for a firm’s investment in CSR, I use data from 
KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. (KLD), a leading provider of research on the social 
performance of corporations. I use the change in the firm’s CSR rating from the prior year as 
a proxy for the firm’s investment in CSR.  
 I define financial reporting quality as the precision with which financial reporting 
conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected cash flows. This 
definition is consistent with the Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 (2010), which states that one objective of financial 
reporting is to inform present and potential investors in assessing the expected firm cash 
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flows.3 Consistent with prior research that examines the relation between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency, I use accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality, and I calculate accruals quality using an augmented Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model following Francis et al. (2005).4 
 Biddle et al. (2009) find that higher-quality financial reporting reduces both over-
investment and under-investment. Following the logic that higher-quality financial reporting 
mitigates the moral hazard problem that results in over-investment in CSR for the manager’s 
private benefit, I hypothesize that higher-quality financial reporting reduces over-investment 
in CSR. To test this hypothesis, I follow the methodology of Biddle et al. (2009) and develop 
a proxy for a firm’s likelihood of over-investment, using firm-specific characteristics (i.e., 
cash and leverage) shown to be associated with over-investment (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 
1986). Consistent with the hypothesis that higher-quality financial reporting reduces over-
investment in CSR, I find that there is a negative association between financial reporting 
quality and investment in CSR for firms operating in settings with higher likelihood of over-
investment. 
 Next, I use an ex-post measure of investment efficiency, future financial performance, 
to examine whether higher-quality financial reporting disciplines managers to invest 
efficiently in CSR. Following the logic that higher-quality financial reporting disciplines 
                                                             
3 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 is part of the FASB’s project with the International 
Accounting Standards Board to improve and converge their frameworks. It supersedes FASB Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (1978). 
 
4 Dechow et al. (2010) stress that the definition of financial reporting quality is contingent on the specific 
decision context. In the context of this study, accruals quality, which maps financial reporting to short-term cash 
flows, is well-suited to test whether financial reporting quality serves a role in disciplining managers’ 
investments in CSR. In particular, the accruals quality measure isolates the likelihood of estimation error in 
accruals. Thus, higher accruals quality allows shareholders to better assess expected firm cash flows, which in 
turn allows shareholders to better monitor managers’ investment decisions and thus encourages managers to 
invest in positive NPV projects. 
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managers to make investments in CSR that benefit shareholders, I hypothesize that for firms 
with high-quality financial reporting, investment in CSR is positively associated with future 
profitability. Consistent with this hypothesis, I show that there is a positive relation between 
investment in CSR and future profitability for firms with high-quality financial reporting 
whereas there is a negative relation between investment in CSR and future profitability for 
firms with low-quality financial reporting. Further analysis shows that the negative relation 
between investment in CSR and future profitability for firms with low-quality financial 
reporting is exacerbated in low consumer sensitivity firms. This suggests that in settings 
where CSR has a tenuous link to financial performance, financial reporting quality plays an 
important role in disciplining managers to avoid inefficient CSR investments. 
 This study contributes to the literature that examines the valuation implications of 
investments in CSR and the literature that examines the role of accounting information in 
investment decisions. Recent studies, including Biddle et al. (2009), Bushman et al. (2011), 
Francis and Martin (2010), Hope and Thomas (2008), and McNichols and Stubben (2008), 
find that financial reporting quality affects investment efficiency. My findings suggest that 
financial reporting quality also plays a role in disciplining managers’ investments in CSR. 
Given the ongoing debate on whether investments in CSR result in value creation or a 
distribution of shareholder wealth, these findings are important as they suggest that financial 
reporting quality is one channel that affects whether CSR results in enhanced financial 
performance. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the construction of the 
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sample and section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 presents the main results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 In recent years, there has been an increased focus on CSR, and socially responsible 
investing has grown at a faster pace than the broader universe of investments.5, 6 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some large corporations invest hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually in CSR.7 Many theories have been proposed to explain CSR investment, and these 
theories can be broadly grouped into two categories: profit-motivated and non-profit 
motivated (Hong et al., 2011). 
 The profit-motivated CSR theories argue that CSR can be an economically justified 
business expenditure that enhances a firm’s future financial performance. The profit-
motivated theories suggest many channels through which CSR can enhance future financial 
performance. For example, CSR can enhance future financial performance by: delivering a 
“warm-glow” to consumers that increases demand for products, attracting higher quality 
employees, improving employee efficiency, reducing conflicts among stakeholders, 
mitigating litigation risk, deterring regulation, signaling product quality, enhancing corporate 
                                                             
5 Socially responsible investment (SRI) is an investment process that integrates social, ethical, and 
environmental considerations into investment decision making (Renneboog et al., 2008). In 2010, 12 percent of 
assets under management were involved in some form of SRI. From 1995 to 2010, professionally managed 
assets following socially responsible investing strategies grew 380 percent to $3 trillion versus a 260 percent 
rise (to $25 trillion) in the broader universe of assets under professional management (Social Investment Forum 
Foundation, 2010). 
 
6 In the wake of the financial crisis, there is growing momentum for social responsibility, and regulators in some 
countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, South Africa) are creating a case for mandatory sustainability reporting or 
mandatory integrated reporting (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011). 
 
7 For example, in 2009, Intel invested $100 million in global education programs and energy conservation 
efforts. General Electric invested $160 million per year in charitable donations and employee philanthropic 
programs in 2007-2009 (Delevingne, 2009). 
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reputation, or reducing waste (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Heal, 2005; Hong et al., 2011; 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a). 
 On the other hand, the key non-profit motivated CSR theory argues from an agency 
theory perspective that CSR is a distribution of shareholder wealth for pursuit of managers’ 
own interests (Friedman, 1970).8 This non-profit motivated theory suggests that absent strong 
control from shareholders, managers can opportunistically invest in CSR as a perquisite or to 
entrench themselves by gaining favor with important stakeholders (Hong et al., 2011). 
Consequently, CSR comes at the expense of good financial performance because CSR makes 
use of firm resources in ways that confer significant managerial benefits rather than devoting 
those resources to alternative investment projects or returning them to shareholders 
(Brammer and Millington, 2008). Consistent with managers over-investing in CSR for their 
private benefit when they bear little of the cost of doing so, Barnea and Rubin (2010) find 
that insiders’ ownership is negatively related to firms’ CSR ratings. 
 In the literature to date, many studies have examined whether investments in CSR 
create firm value. In particular, many studies in the management literature have examined the 
link between CSR and corporate financial performance.9 Margolis et al. (2007) conduct a 
meta-analysis of hundreds of these studies and find that the overall relation between CSR and 
corporate financial performance is positive but small.10 Although many studies have 
                                                             
8 Another non-profit motivated explanation for CSR is that shareholders delegate CSR (i.e., philanthropy) to the 
firm on their behalf because the firm faces a lower cost of giving (Friedman, 1970). 
 
9 These studies often employ a cross-sectional research design and look for a contemporaneous link between 
CSR and corporate financial performance (Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
 
10 However, many of the empirical studies (58%) document a non-significant relation between CSR and 
corporate financial performance (Margolis et al., 2007). 
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examined the valuation implications of CSR, this is still very much an open question in the 
literature. 
 Studies that find that CSR is positively related to financial performance provide 
evidence for profit-motivated theories of CSR. For example, Lev et al. (2009) find that CSR 
(i.e., charitable contributions) is significantly positively associated with future revenue, 
particularly for firms that are highly sensitive to consumer perception. This is consistent with 
the profit-motivated theory that CSR delivers a “warm-glow” to consumers that increases 
demand for products. Similarly, Fisman et al. (2006) develop a model in which CSR is a 
signal of unobservable product quality and provide empirical evidence that CSR (i.e., 
corporate philanthropy) and profits are positively related only in industries with high 
advertising intensity. Ioannou and Serafeim (2010a) provide additional evidence that CSR 
creates firm value, finding that firms with better CSR performance receive more favorable 
analyst recommendations in recent years.  
 Several recent studies examine the effect of CSR on the cost of equity capital. For 
example, El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that firms with better CSR performance have lower cost 
of equity capital. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) focus on firms that initiate voluntary disclosure of 
CSR and find that initiating firms with superior CSR performance enjoy a subsequent 
reduction in the cost of equity capital.11 
 Another recent paper, Hong et al. (2011), explores the determinants of firms’ 
investments in CSR. Hong et al. (2011) model the firm’s optimal choice of capital and CSR 
subject to financial constraints and find, consistent with model predictions, that less-
                                                             
11 Plumlee et al. (2010) examine the relation between the quality of firms’ voluntary environmental disclosures 
and firm value. Plumlee et al. (2010) find that higher-quality voluntary environmental disclosures classified as 
soft (i.e., subjective) and positive are negatively associated with the cost of equity capital. 
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constrained firms have higher CSR scores. The study also seeks to empirically establish 
causality using a natural experiment, the relaxation of financial constraints during the 
technology bubble. The study finds that during the technology bubble, previously constrained 
firms experienced a temporary relaxation of their constraints and their CSR scores also 
temporarily increased relative to their previously unconstrained peers. 
2.2 Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency 
 In perfect financial markets absent market frictions caused by information 
asymmetry, firms invest efficiently. That is, firms undertake only projects with positive net 
present value. However, the existence of information asymmetry can result in managers 
making investment decisions that are not in the best interest of shareholders in order to 
maximize their own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This moral hazard problem can 
result in managers investing inefficiently, e.g., by over-investing in projects with negative net 
present value for their own personal benefit. For example, Jensen (1986) predicts that 
managers have incentives to consume perquisites and to grow firms beyond their optimal 
size. 
 Prior research suggests that higher-quality financial reporting can enhance investment 
efficiency by mitigating the moral hazard problem that results in inefficient investment 
decisions (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001). Empirical results are also consistent with the 
prediction that higher-quality financial reporting enhances investment efficiency. For 
example, Biddle et al. (2009) find that higher-quality financial reporting improves investment 
efficiency by reducing over- and under- investment. 
 In particular, several studies show that higher-quality financial reporting improves 
investment efficiency by mitigating the moral hazard problem that results in managers’  
10 
 
over-investment. For example, McNichols and Stubben (2008) find that firms that 
manipulate their earnings over-invest during the misreporting period and no longer over-
invest following the misreporting period. Hope and Thomas (2008) find evidence that 
relative to firms that disclose earnings by geographic area, non-disclosing firms experience 
greater expansion of foreign sales, produce lower foreign profit margins, and have lower firm 
value.12 Francis and Martin (2010) find that firms with more timely loss recognition make 
more profitable acquisitions and are less likely to make post-acquisition divestitures, 
consistent with better ex-ante investment decisions. In an international context, Bushman et 
al. (2011) find that firms in countries characterized by greater timely loss recognition have 
more efficient investment in the sense that investment responds more quickly to declines in 
investment opportunities. 
 Higher-quality financial reporting can increase investment efficiency by increasing 
shareholders’ ability to monitor managers’ investment decisions, thus reducing information 
asymmetry and moral hazard. As an input to corporate control mechanisms, higher-quality 
financial accounting information can improve investment efficiency by increasing the 
efficiency with which assets in place are managed, by encouraging investments in high return 
projects, by reducing investments in low return projects, or by reducing the expropriation of 
investors’ wealth (Bushman and Smith, 2001). For example, higher-quality financial 
reporting could curb managerial incentives to over-invest if it facilitates writing better 
contracts or increases shareholders’ ability to monitor investment decisions (Biddle et al., 
2009). 
                                                             
12 Hope and Thomas (2008) use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, after 
which most U.S. multinational firms were no longer required to disclose earnings by geographic area, as a 
natural experiment. Thus, their conclusions are strengthened by the fact that the differences did not exist in the 
pre- SFAS 131 period. 
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2.3 Hypothesis development 
 My first hypothesis is motivated by the Biddle et al. (2009) finding that higher-quality 
financial reporting reduces both over-investment and under-investment. This result is 
consistent with the logic that higher-quality financial reporting mitigates the moral hazard 
problem that results in investment inefficiency. With respect to investments in CSR, I expect 
that the moral hazard problem that results in over-investment is likely exacerbated, as 
investments in CSR can provide certain private benefits to managers that would not be 
expected from a typical investment (e.g., reputational gains, enhanced social status, or a 
“warm-glow” from supporting a social cause).13 If higher-quality financial reporting 
mitigates managerial incentives to over-invest by allowing shareholders to better monitor 
managers’ investment decisions, I expect firms with higher-quality financial reporting will 
exhibit less over-investment in CSR. 
 Following the logic that higher-quality financial reporting mitigates the moral hazard 
problem that results in over-investment in CSR for the manager’s private benefit, I 
hypothesize that higher-quality financial reporting reduces over-investment in CSR. This 
leads to the following specific hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H1: Financial reporting quality is negatively associated with CSR investment in firms 
with a higher likelihood of over-investment. 
 
 Many prior studies have examined the relation between CSR and financial 
performance (Brammer and Millington, 2008; Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003). I 
seek to provide further evidence on whether higher-quality financial reporting results in 
improved CSR investment efficiency by examining an ex-post measure of investment 
                                                             
13 For this reason, I also expect that under-investment in CSR is a less-likely problem for shareholders. 
Proponents of CSR that argue that corporations under-invest in CSR usually argue from a social welfare 
perspective rather than a shareholder welfare perspective. 
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efficiency: future financial performance. In using future financial performance as an ex-post 
measure of CSR investment efficiency, I rely on the following logic. First, a positive relation 
between CSR and future financial performance is indicative of an efficient investment in 
CSR (i.e., a positive net present value investment that is beneficial to shareholders). Second, 
a negative relation between CSR and future financial performance is indicative of an 
inefficient investment in CSR (i.e., a negative net present value investment that represents 
private benefits to managers at the detriment of shareholders). 
 Bushman and Smith (2001) assert that higher-quality financial reporting can improve 
investment efficiency by encouraging investments in high return projects and increasing the 
efficiency with which assets in place are managed. If higher-quality financial reporting 
mitigates moral hazard and disciplines managers to make efficient investments in CSR, I 
expect that for firms with high-quality financial reporting, investment in CSR is positively 
associated with future profitability. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form:  
H2: CSR investment is positively associated with future profitability in firms with 
high-quality financial reporting. 
 
 Prior research has shown that in high consumer sensitivity firms, investments in CSR 
are positively associated with future revenues (Lev et al., 2009).14 This is consistent with the 
explanation that in high consumer sensitivity firms, CSR can deliver a “warm-glow” to 
consumers that increases demand for products. Thus, in high consumer sensitivity firms, 
CSR can be a legitimate, profit-motivated expenditure, with a role similar to an advertising 
expenditure. In contrast, in low consumer sensitivity firms, Lev et al. (2009) find no 
                                                             
14 Lev et al. (2009) define high consumer sensitivity firms as those firms that produce goods and services 
primarily for individual customers. 
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association between CSR and future revenues. This is consistent with there being little role 
for CSR to increase consumer demand in low consumer sensitivity firms. Following prior 
literature, I expect that in low consumer sensitivity firms, CSR has a weaker link to financial 
performance and is thus ex-ante more likely to be an inefficient investment. Following this 
logic, I expect that for firms with low consumer sensitivity, higher-quality financial reporting 
is particularly important in disciplining managers to avoid inefficient investments in CSR. 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 I employ a sample of firms from the KLD STATS database, which provides data on 
firms’ corporate social responsibility prepared by KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. 
(KLD).15, 16 KLD ranks firms’ CSR performance in seven main categories: 1) Community, 2) 
Corporate Governance, 3) Diversity, 4) Employee Relations, 5) Environment, 6) Human 
Rights, and 7) Product. For each category, KLD defines a set of potential strengths and 
assigns a value of 1 if the strength exists, and a value of 0 otherwise.17 The rankings are 
based on information obtained from financial statements, government documents, 
mainstream media, and company communications (KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., 2006). 
                                                             
15 KLD STATS provides yearly social performance evaluations beginning in 1991. In 1991, KLD covered 
approximately 650 companies (comprising firms in the S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social Index). During 2001 to 
2002, KLD expanded its coverage to include all companies on the Russell 1000 Index and in 2003 it expanded 
its coverage to include all companies on the Russell 3000 Index.  
 
16 The KLD database is widely used in recent CSR research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Hong et al., 2011; 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a; El Ghoul et al., 2011). 
 
17 KLD’s use of indicator variables to rate firms’ CSR performance is a crude methodology that results in a 
noisy measure of CSR performance. In fact, Chatterji et al. (2009) show that KLD environmental strengths do 
not accurately predict pollution levels or compliance violations and that KLD ratings do not optimally use 
publicly available data. Ideally, I would like to have precise data on firms’ actual CSR expenditures. Since this 
precise data is not available, I use the KLD data to construct a proxy for firms’ investments in CSR and contend 
that the noise in this proxy should bias against findings. 
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Similar to Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Appendix B presents the main categories of CSR strengths 
employed by KLD in its rating process and the average rating scores across industries. 
 I begin with all firm-year observations in KLD STATS from 1991-2009 and merge 
this data with the Compustat database.18 I delete firms in the utility and financial industries 
(i.e., firms with SIC codes 4900-4999 or 6000-6999).19 I also delete firms that are involved in 
producing alcohol, tobacco, and gaming (i.e., “sin” firms).20 I retain in my sample those firms 
that are in the intersection of the KLD STATS and Compustat databases with sufficient 
available data to construct all variables used in the empirical specifications. I winsorize all 
continuous, non-logarithmic variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effects of 
outliers. The final sample consists of 10,107 firm-year observations representing 1,860 firms 
from 1992-2009. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1, Panel A provides sample descriptive statistics. The mean (median) 
CSR_Level across all firm-years is 1.54 (1) and the mean (median) CSR_Change is 0.12 (0). 
The mean (median) firm in the sample has an AQ of -0.045 (-0.033), which is consistent with 
prior research (Francis et al., 2005). Table 1, Panel B provides sample descriptive statistics 
for firm-years with large investments in CSR (HighCSR_Change=1) and those without large 
                                                             
18 To merge KLD STATS with Compustat, I first link KLD STATS to CRSP data using ticker symbol. I ensure 
the validity of the match by comparing company name per KLD STATS to company name per CRSP. 
 
19 Prior literature that examines the relation between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency 
excludes firms in the utility and financial industries because of the different nature of investment and financial 
reporting for these firms. 
 
20 Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that sin stocks: are less held by norm-constrained institutions, receive less 
analyst coverage, and have higher expected returns than comparable stocks. I exclude sin firms from this study 
as CSR is likely to have vastly different incentives for sin firms. I use the KLD data to identify sin firms, i.e., 
those firms with a concern in KLD’s Alcohol, Gambling, or Tobacco controversial business issues categories. 
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investments in CSR (HighCSR_Change=0).21 The HighCSR_Change=1 and 
HighCSR_Change=0 sample partitions have statistically significant differences in mean 
values for many firm-level variables. In particular, firms with large investments in CSR 
(HighCSR_Change=1) are larger, more profitable, and have larger cash flows and larger 
market-to-book ratios. Table 2 presents the correlations among the main variables. The CSR 
variables, CSR_Level and  CSR_Change, are significantly positively correlated (Pearson 
correlation of 0.30). 
4. Research Design 
 To test the hypotheses, I first develop proxies for two constructs key to this analysis: 
investment in CSR and financial reporting quality. 
4.1 Proxy for investment in CSR 
 I use the KLD data to construct a proxy for a firm’s investment in CSR. First, for 
each firm-year, I construct the variable CSR_Level, which is the sum of the strengths in 
KLD’s Community, Diversity, Employee, and Environment categories.22 I then construct 
CSR_Change, the change in the firm’s CSR_Level from the prior year, CSR_Levelt - 
CSR_Levelt-1. As firms’ CSR policies (and KLD ratings) are likely to be sticky across years, I 
use CSR_Change as a proxy for a firm’s investment in CSR, as a KLD rating increase is 
                                                             
21 HighCSR_Change is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of firms each year ranked 
by CSR_Change. 
 
22 In constructing the CSR_Level variable, I do not include KLD’s Corporate Governance, Human Rights, or 
Product categories. I exclude the Corporate Governance category for the following reasons: 1) it is likely to 
capture a construct different from other CSR categories, 2) it is likely to benefit the investor stakeholder group 
and thus be less subject to the moral hazard problem than the other CSR categories, and 3) it includes a 
Transparency subcategory which could be correlated with financial statement reporting quality. Additionally, 
Hong et al. (2011) find that a factor analysis of the KLD strength categories places a zero weight on the 
Corporate Governance category, providing empirical justification for excluding Corporate Governance from the 
CSR_Level variable. I exclude the Human Rights category, consistent with Hong et al. (2011), as the 
composition of this category is not consistent over time. Following the logic of Fisman et al. (2006), I exclude 
the Product category which has “obvious and direct profit implications” as it measures product quality and 
R&D expenditures. Refer to Appendix B for a description of KLD’s strength categories. 
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likely to coincide with years in which a firm makes an investment in CSR.23 I then create an 
indicator variable, HighCSR_Change, equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of firms each 
year ranked by CSR_Change, which is a proxy for firms with large investments in CSR. In a 
subsequent test, I provide empirical validation that HighCSR_Change captures firm-years 
with CSR investments. 
4.2 Proxy for financial reporting quality 
 Consistent with prior research that examines the relation between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency, I use accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Following Francis et al. (2005), I measure accruals quality using the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) approach augmented with the fundamental variables of the modified Jones 
(1991) model, change in revenues and PPE.24 The AQ metric is based on the following 
annual, cross-sectional model (in which all variables are scaled by average total assets): 
ܶܥܣ௝,௧ =  ϕ଴,௝ + ϕଵ,௝ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ିଵ + ϕଶ,௝ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ + ϕଷ,௝ܥܨ ௝ܱ,௧ାଵ + ϕସ,௝∆ܴ݁ݒ௝,௧ + ϕହ,௝ܲܲܧ௝,௧ +
௝߭,௧                        (1) 
where TCA = total current accruals, equal to (∆CA-∆CL-∆Cash +∆STDebt); CFO = cash 
flow from operations, equal to (Nibex-TA); Nibex = net income before extraordinary items; 
TA = total accruals, equal to (∆CA-∆CL-∆Cash +∆STDebt-DEPN); ∆Rev = change in 
revenues; PPE = gross value of PPE; ∆CA = change in current assets; ∆CL = change in 
current liabilities; ∆Cash = change in cash; ∆STDebt = change in debt in current liabilities; 
and DEPN = depreciation and amortization expense. 
                                                             
23 Similarly, Kim and Statman (2011) use the change in the KLD environmental score as a proxy for a firm’s 
investment in environmental responsibility. 
 
24 The inclusion of change in revenue and PPE follows the suggestion of the McNichols (2002) discussion of 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. 
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 I estimate Eq. (1) for each of Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry groups with at 
least 20 firms in year t, after winsorizing variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. AQj,t  is 
computed as the standard deviation of firm j’s residuals, vj,t, calculated over years t-4 through 
t and multiplied by negative one. As a large standard deviation of residuals indicates poor 
accruals quality, multiplying by negative one results in an AQ variable that is increasing in 
accruals quality. 
4.3 Examination of the determinants of investment in CSR 
 To provide empirical validation that HighCSR_Change captures firm-years with CSR 
investments, I estimate the following probit regression model, which examines the 
determinants of investments in CSR: 
ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܽݏℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܥܨܱ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଷܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସܯܶܤ௜,௧ିଵ +
ߚହ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܣܳ௜,௧ିଵ +  ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧     (2) 
 As described above, HighCSR_Change is an indicator variable designed as a proxy 
for firms with investments in CSR and AQ is accruals quality. All other variables are as 
described in Appendix A. Controls is a set of control variables, η is an industry fixed-effect 
using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification, and φ is a year fixed-effect.  
4.4 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 To test whether financial reporting quality is negatively associated with CSR 
investment in firms with a higher likelihood of over-investment (H1), I follow the empirical 
methodology of Biddle et al. (2009). First, I construct the variable Overi, designed as a proxy 
for a firm’s likelihood of over-investment, using firm-specific characteristics (i.e., cash and 
leverage) shown to be associated with over-investment. Specifically, following Biddle et al. 
(2009), Overi is computed as the average of the firm’s decile rank of cash and the firm’s 
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decile rank of (leverage*-1), both ranked by year. This measure relies on the arguments that 
firms with large cash balances are more likely to face agency problems and over-invest 
(Jensen, 1986) and that firms with low leverage are less likely to suffer the debt overhang 
problem that would force them to under-invest (Myers, 1977). I next estimate the following 
probit regression model: 
ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܣܳ_ܴܽ݊݇௜,௧ + ߚଶܣܳ_ܴܽ݊݇௜,௧ ∗ ܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ +
ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧             (3) 
where HighCSR_Change is an indicator variable designed as a proxy for firms with 
investments in CSR. AQ_Rank is the decile rank of accruals quality. HighOveri is an 
indicator variable used to distinguish firms in settings with higher likelihood of over-
investment. Controls is a set of control variables, η is an industry fixed-effect using the Fama 
and French (1997) 48-industry classification, and φ is a year fixed-effect. 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with 
CSR investment in firms with a higher likelihood of over-investment. In a linear specification 
of Eq. (3), the coefficient ߚଶ would measure the incremental relation between financial 
reporting quality and investment in CSR for firms with a higher likelihood of over-
investment, and a significantly negative ߚଶ coefficient would provide evidence, consistent 
with H1, that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with CSR investment in 
firms with a higher likelihood of over-investment.25 However, the nonlinearity of the probit 
specification makes the interaction coefficient difficult to interpret directly. Specifically, in 
the nonlinear probit specification of Eq. (3), one cannot merely assess the sign and 
                                                             
25 Also, in a linear specification of Eq. (3), the total effect of financial reporting quality on investment in CSR 
for firms with a higher likelihood of over-investment would be measured by the sum of the coefficients on 
financial reporting quality and the interaction between financial reporting quality and HighOveri (i.e., β1+β2). 
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significance of ߚଶ to assess the marginal effect of the interaction term as in the linear 
model.26 Thus, following the recommended methodology of Ai and Norton (2003), I 
calculate the marginal effect of the interaction term (i.e., the cross-partial derivative with 
respect to the two interacted variables) and assess the statistical significance of the marginal 
effect using the delta method.27 Greene (2010) critiques the Ai and Norton (2003) method’s 
use of statistical tests to interpret the interaction effect and suggests that graphical analysis 
can be more informative than statistical tests in interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear 
models.28, 29 Thus, following the recommendation of Greene (2010), I also present graphical 
analysis of the interaction effect. 
 To provide further evidence on whether financial reporting quality mitigates over-
investment in CSR for firms with a higher likelihood of over-investment, I use an alternative 
research design. I estimate the following probit regression model for the full sample and for 
firms in the HighAQ=1, MiddleAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions: 
 ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜,௧    (4) 
where the HighAQ=1, MiddleAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions represent firm-years in the top 
decile, middle deciles, and bottom decile of AQ_Rank, and all other variables are as 
previously defined. A significantly positive β1 coefficient indicates that firms with a higher 
                                                             
26 For interaction terms in nonlinear models, both signs and z-statistics for marginal effects could change 
dramatically from those for coefficient estimates (Powers, 2005). 
 
27 Ai et al. (2004) provide additional details on empirically implementing the Ai and Norton (2003) 
methodology. 
 
28 In particular, In particular, Greene (2010) argues that the marginal effect of the interaction term is difficult to 
interpret in terms of the relations among the variables in the model because the concept of the “unit change” 
may be unreasonable. 
 
29 Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) also critique the Ai and Norton (2003) method and contend that it is perfectly 
correct to use just the interaction term and its standard error to draw inferences about the interactive effect in a 
nonlinear model. 
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likelihood of over-investment have a higher likelihood of investment in CSR, which is 
consistent with over-investment in CSR. By estimating this probit specification across 
sample partitions, I allow the relation between HighOveri and HighCSR_Change to differ 
conditional on the financial reporting quality. I employ Monte Carlo randomization to test 
whether the marginal effects of the HighOveri coefficients are different across the sample 
partitions. Appendix C provides a description of the Monte Carlo randomization test 
methodology. 
 In the tests of Hypothesis 1, I include several control variables. I control for market-
to-book and Size as these variables are likely to be related to investment behavior. I also 
control for a series of firm-specific factors to mitigate concerns that the observed relation is 
driven by innate firm factors that influence both accruals quality and investment in CSR. 
Specifically, I control for the standard deviation of cash flows, the standard deviation of 
sales, the length of the firm’s operating cycle, and the frequency of losses (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005). I also control for year fixed-effects and for industry 
fixed-effects using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification as investment in 
CSR is likely to vary by industry (Fisman et al., 2006). I cluster standard errors by firm. 
4.5 Test of Hypothesis 2 
 To test whether CSR investment is positively associated with future profitability in 
firms with high-quality financial reporting (H2), I estimate the following ordinary-least-
squares regressions: 
 ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜,௧ାଵ                         (5) 
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 ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ + ߚଷܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ +
∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧ାଵ                    (6) 
where Nibex is net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets, 
LowCSR_Change is an indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the bottom decile 
of firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, and all other variables are as previously 
defined.30 
 I estimate Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) for the full sample and for firms in the HighAQ=1 and 
LowAQ=1 partitions.31 The test of H2 focuses on the sign and significance of β2, which 
estimates the effect of an investment in CSR on future profitability, after controlling for 
current profitability. By estimating this specification across sample partitions, I allow the 
slope on HighCSR_Change to differ conditional on the financial reporting quality. I test the 
significance of relevant coefficients across partitions using an untabulated fully-interacted 
specification. 
 To further explore the role of financial reporting quality in disciplining investments in 
CSR, I estimate the following ordinary-least-squares regressions: 
 ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧+ ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗
ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧+ ߚ଺ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ + ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧ାଵ                                      (7) 
 
                                                             
30 Although Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) are nested models, I estimate both the reduced and full models to show that 
results from the estimation of the reduced model are robust to controlling for firms with CSR divestments 
(LowCSR_Change=1) in the full model. 
 
31 Estimating Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) across samples partitioned by HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 is econometrically 
equivalent to a fully-interacted specification in which all of the independent variables, including the control 
variables, are interacted with the HighAQ and LowAQ variables. For expositional simplicity, I present results for 
the estimation of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) across sample partitions. The fully-interacted specification is available 
upon request.  
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ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧+ ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗
ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ + ߚସܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ +  ߚହܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗
ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧+ ߚ଺ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ + ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧ାଵ                                         (8) 
where Nibex is net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets, 
LowConsumerSensitivity is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in industries with 
below-median advertising expense to sales (following Fisman et al., 2006), and all other 
variables are as previously defined.32 
 Estimating Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) on the full sample allows for a differential relation 
between CSR investment and future profitability for firms in high versus low consumer 
sensitivity industries. Specifically, β2 captures the effect of an investment in CSR on future 
profitability for firms in high consumer sensitivity industries. β3 captures the incremental 
effect of an investment in CSR on future profitability for firms in low consumer sensitivity 
industries, and (β2 + β3) captures the total effect of an investment in CSR on future 
profitability for firms in low consumer sensitivity industries.  
 I estimate Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) for the full sample and for firms in the HighAQ=1 and 
LowAQ=1 partitions.33 By estimating this specification across sample partitions, I allow the 
relation between CSR investment and future profitability to vary conditional on consumer 
                                                             
32 Although Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are nested models, I estimate both the reduced and full models to show that 
results from the estimation of the reduced model are robust to controlling for firms with CSR divestments 
(LowCSR_Change=1) in the full model. 
 
33 Estimating Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) across samples partitioned by HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 is econometrically 
equivalent to a fully-interacted specification in which all of the independent variables, including the control 
variables, are interacted with the HighAQ and LowAQ variables. For expositional simplicity, I present results for 
the estimation of Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) across sample partitions. The fully-interacted specification is available 
upon request. 
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sensitivity and financial reporting quality. I test the significance of relevant coefficients 
across partitions using an untabulated fully-interacted specification. 
 In the tests of Hypothesis 2, I include several control variables. Most importantly, I 
control for current profitability, Nibext. I control for leverage and Size, as these variables are 
likely to be related to future profitability, and for a series of firm-specific factors to mitigate 
concerns that the observed relation is driven by innate firm factors. I also control for year 
fixed-effects and for industry fixed-effects using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification, and I cluster standard errors by firm. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Examination of the determinants of investment in CSR 
 Table 3 reports the results of estimating Eq. (2), which examines the determinants of 
investments in CSR. Models (1) - (3) provide evidence that investment in CSR is positively 
related to cash and cash flow and negatively related to leverage. This result provides 
empirical validation that HighCSR_Change captures firm-years with CSR investments, as it 
indicates that firms that are less financially constrained are more likely to invest in CSR. This 
result is consistent with the Hong et al. (2011) empirical finding that less financially-
constrained firms have higher CSR scores and that a relaxation of financial constraints leads 
to an increase in CSR investment. This result also provides empirical validation for using the 
Overi variable as a proxy for a firm’s likelihood of over-investment. 
 Models (1) - (3) also show a positive relation between firm size and investment in 
CSR, consistent with findings in prior literature (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a). This is 
consistent with the prediction that highly visible firms have greater incentives to invest in 
CSR (Brammer and Millington, 2008; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a). Also, models (1) - (3) 
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show a positive relation between market-to-book ratio and investment in CSR, consistent 
with prior literature (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010b). Finally, model (3) shows an 
insignificant relation between AQ and investment in CSR for the full sample (coefficient of -
0.693, z-statistic of -0.95). This suggests that the role of financial reporting quality in 
disciplining investments in CSR is conditional on the specific setting in which the firm 
operates (e.g., whether the firm operates in a setting with high likelihood of over-
investment). This will be explored further in subsequent tests. 
5.2 Financial reporting quality and over-investment in CSR 
 Table 4 reports the results of the test of hypothesis H1, which predicts that higher-
quality financial reporting reduces over-investment in CSR. I find evidence that financial 
reporting quality is negatively associated with CSR investment in firms with a higher 
likelihood of over-investment, consistent with H1. Specifically, there is a significant negative 
coefficient on the interaction between financial reporting quality and higher likelihood of 
over-investment, AQ_Rank*HighOveri (coefficient of -0.269, z-statistic of -1.94).34 The 
marginal effect of the interaction between AQ_Rank and HighOveri is negative and 
significant (marginal effect of approximately -0.04, significant at the 10% level two-tailed, 
calculated in accordance with the methodology of Ai and Norton, 2003). In accordance with 
Greene (2010), which suggests that graphical analysis can be more informative than 
statistical tests in interpreting the interaction effects in nonlinear models, I also present 
graphical analysis of the interaction effect.  
                                                             
34 Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) contend that it is perfectly correct to use just the interaction term and its 
standard error to draw inferences about the interactive effect in a nonlinear model. Given the debate in the 
literature, I also show that results are consistent using the Ai and Norton (2003) methodology and using the 
Greene (2010) recommendation of graphical analysis. 
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Appendix D presents the marginal effect of the interaction term, calculated as the cross-
partial derivative with respect to the two interacted variables. Consistent with the statistical 
test, the graphical analysis provides evidence of a negative marginal effect of the interaction 
between AQ_Rank and HighOveri. Thus, the findings in Table 4 coupled with the graphical 
analysis of Appendix D provide consistent support for hypothesis H1. 35 Also, the coefficient 
on HighOveri is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.261, z-statistic of 2.96), consistent 
with over-investment in CSR.36 
 In terms of the relation between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR for 
firms with a higher likelihood of under-investing, I find that the estimated coefficient on 
AQ_Rank is insignificantly positive (coefficient of 0.143, z-statistic of 1.41). In contrast, 
Biddle et al. (2009) find a significantly positive coefficient on financial reporting quality in 
their regression which examines the relation between financial reporting quality and overall 
investment. This Biddle et al. (2009) result is consistent with higher-quality financial 
reporting reducing under-investment (i.e., increasing investment in firms that are likely to 
under-invest). My result suggests that higher-quality financial reporting does not increase 
investment in CSR in firms that are likely to under-invest. This is in line with the Hong et al. 
(2011) model which proposes that financially-constrained firms do not have enough funding 
to achieve first-best level of investment and therefore spend nothing on CSR. 
                                                             
35 In an untabulated robustness test, I re-estimate Eq. (3) after excluding the firms with CSR divestments 
(LowCSR_Change=1). The results are robust to this specification, with a significant negative coefficient on the 
interaction between financial reporting quality and higher likelihood of over-investment, AQ_Rank*HighOveri 
(coefficient of -0.316, z-statistic of -2.20). The increased significance of the interaction term indicates that 
including the CSR divestment observations induces noise that reduces the power of the statistical tests. 
 
36 In the specification of Eq. (3), similar to Biddle et al. (2009), the coefficient on HighOveri measures the effect 
of high likelihood of over-investment on investment in CSR when accrual quality is zero, which is never the 
case in this sample. In an untabulated regression, I re-estimate the model after centering accrual quality at zero, 
and the coefficient on HighOveri remains positive and significant as predicted. 
 
26 
 
 Table 5 reports the results of estimating Eq. (4). As reported in model (1), firms with 
a higher likelihood of over-investment have a higher likelihood of investment in CSR, which 
is consistent with over-investment in CSR. This is evidenced by the significantly positive 
coefficient on HighOveri for the full sample (coefficient of 0.110, z-statistic of 2.64). Model 
(2) provides evidence that high-quality financial reporting mitigates over-investment in CSR, 
as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on HighOveri in the HighAQ=1 partition 
(coefficient of -0.132, z-statistic of -0.86). Models (3) and (4) provide evidence consistent 
with over-investment in CSR in the MiddleAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions as indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficients on HighOveri (coefficients of 0.126, 0.428 and z-statistic 
of 2.71, 2.72 for the MiddleAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions, respectively). The Monte Carlo 
randomization test indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in the marginal 
effects of the HighOveri coefficients across the HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions (p-value 
of 0.03), consistent with higher-quality financial reporting mitigating over-investment in 
CSR. Overall, the findings in Table 4 and 5 are consistent with higher-quality financial 
reporting reducing over-investment in CSR. 
5.3 Financial reporting quality and ex-post investment efficiency 
 Table 6 reports the results of the test of hypothesis H2, which predicts that CSR 
investment is positively associated with future profitability in firms with high-quality 
financial reporting. Table 6 estimates Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), and the coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change represents an estimate of the effect of an investment in CSR on future 
profitability, after controlling for current profitability and other observable firm-level 
determinants of future performance.37 
                                                             
37 Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) also control for the effect of industry and year on future financial performance with fixed- 
effects. 
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 Models (1) and (2) provide evidence that investment in CSR is unrelated to future 
profitability for the full sample, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change (coefficient of 0.004 and t-statistic of 1.32 for model (1)). This is 
consistent with many empirical findings in the management literature.38 Consistent with H2, 
model (3) provides evidence that CSR investment is positively associated with future 
profitability in firms with high-quality financial reporting, as indicated by the significant 
positive coefficient on HighCSR_Change (coefficient of 0.0064, t-statistic of 1.71). The 
coefficient of 0.0064 indicates that in the year following investment in CSR, profitability is 
.64 percentage points higher for firms in the HighAQ=1 partition that invest in CSR versus 
those that do not. This difference is economically significant, as it represents 12.7% of the 
mean profitability in year t+1 of firms without investments in CSR. 
 In sharp contrast to the high-quality financial reporting partition, model (4) provides 
evidence that CSR investment is negatively associated with future profitability in firms with 
low-quality financial reporting, as indicated by the significant negative coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change (coefficient of -0.032, t-statistic of -2.05). The coefficient of -0.032 
indicates that in the year following investment in CSR, profitability is 3.2 percentage points 
lower for firms in the LowAQ=1 partition that invest in CSR versus those that do not. This 
difference represents 63.6% of the mean profitability in year t+1 of firms without 
investments in CSR, suggesting that investment in CSR in low-quality financial reporting 
firms is detrimental to shareholders. The fully-interacted specification shows that the 
coefficient on HighCSR_Change is statistically different across the HighAQ=1 and 
                                                             
38 Margolis et al. (2007) conduct a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies that examine the relation between CSR 
and corporate financial performance and find that while the overall relation is positive but small, many studies 
(58%) document a non-significant relation. 
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LowAQ=1 partitions (difference of 0.039, p-value of 0.01). Also, the coefficient on Nibext is 
larger in the HighAQ=1 partition than the LowAQ=1 partition (coefficient of 0.879 versus 
0.404 in models (3), (4)), consistent with the prior literature finding that firms with better 
accruals quality have more persistent earnings (Francis et al., 2004). 
 Models (5) and (6) provide results consistent with models (3) and (4), after 
controlling for firms with CSR divestments (LowCSR_Change=1). Interestingly, the fully-
interacted specification reveals that the coefficient on LowCSR_Change is statistically 
indistinguishable across the HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions (p-value of 0.59), 
suggesting that CSR divestment does not have differential implications for future 
profitability conditional on firms’ financial reporting quality. 
 Overall, the results in Table 6 show that there is a positive relation between 
investment in CSR and future profitability for firms with high-quality financial reporting 
whereas there is a negative relation between investment in CSR and future profitability for 
firms with low-quality financial reporting. This is consistent with the interpretation that high-
quality financial reporting disciplines managers to invest efficiently in CSR that benefits 
shareholders, whereas low-quality financial reporting allows managers to invest inefficiently 
in CSR to obtain private benefits at the detriment of shareholders. 
 Table 7 reports the results of estimating Eq. (7) and Eq. (8). Models (1) and (2) 
provide evidence that for firms in high consumer sensitivity industries, investment in CSR is 
positively related to future profitability, as indicated by the significant positive coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change (coefficient of 0.012 and t-statistic of 3.15 for model (1)). This is 
consistent with findings in the prior literature that in high consumer sensitivity industries 
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where CSR investments can increase consumer demand, investment in CSR is positively 
related to financial performance (e.g., Lev et al., 2009; Fisman et al., 2006).   
 Consistent with the prediction that CSR is less likely to be directly related to future 
financial performance for firms in low consumer sensitivity industries, Models (1) and (2) 
indicate a negative incremental effect of an investment in CSR on future profitability for 
firms in low consumer sensitivity industries (coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change*LowConsumerSensitivity of -0.016 and t-statistic of -2.85 for model (1)). 
Thus, for firms in low consumer sensitivity industries, models (1) and (2) indicate investment 
in CSR is insignificantly related to future profitability (i.e., sum of coefficients on 
HighCSR_Change and HighCSR_Change*LowConsumerSensitivity is insignificantly 
different from zero in untabulated tests). 
 For high consumer sensitivity firms, model (3) provides evidence that CSR 
investment is positively associated with future profitability in firms with high-quality 
financial reporting, as indicated by the significant positive coefficient on HighCSR_Change 
(coefficient of 0.0088, t-statistic of 1.88). For high consumer sensitivity firms, model (4) 
provides evidence that CSR investment is insignificantly negatively associated with future 
profitability in firms with low-quality financial reporting (coefficient on HighCSR_Change 
of -0.0004, t-statistic of -0.03).39  
 For low consumer sensitivity firms, model (3) provides evidence that CSR investment 
is insignificantly positively associated with future profitability in firms with high-quality 
financial reporting, as indicated by the sum of coefficients on HighCSR_Change and 
                                                             
39 The fully-interacted specification shows that the coefficient on HighCSR_Change is statistically 
indistinguishable across the HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 partitions for high consumer sensitivity firms (difference 
of 0.0092, p-value of 0.58). 
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HighCSR_Change*LowConsumerSensitivity (sum of coefficients of 0.0035, p-value of 0.53).  
In stark contrast, for low consumer sensitivity firms, model (4) provides evidence that CSR 
investment is significantly negatively associated with future profitability in firms with low-
quality financial reporting, as indicated by the sum of coefficients on HighCSR_Change and 
HighCSR_Change*LowConsumerSensitivity (sum of coefficients of -0.060, p-value of 
0.01).40, 41 Thus, model (4) shows that the negative relation between investment in CSR and 
future profitability for firms with low-quality financial reporting is exacerbated in low 
consumer sensitivity firms. Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that in settings where CSR 
has a tenuous link to financial performance (e.g., firms with low consumer sensitivity), 
financial reporting quality plays a particularly important role in disciplining managers to 
avoid inefficient CSR investments that are detrimental to shareholders. 
6. Conclusion 
 I investigate the role of financial reporting quality in disciplining managers’ 
investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR). I hypothesize and find that higher-
quality financial reporting reduces over-investment in CSR. This is consistent with the logic 
that higher-quality financial reporting mitigates the moral hazard problem that results in 
over-investment in CSR for the manager’s private benefit. 
 To further explore whether high-quality financial reporting disciplines managers to 
invest efficiently in CSR, I use an ex-post measure of investment efficiency, future financial 
performance. I hypothesize and find that for firms with high-quality financial reporting, 
                                                             
40 The fully-interacted specification shows that for low consumer sensitivity firms, the total coefficient on 
HighCSR_Change (i.e., the sum of coefficients on HighCSR_Change and 
HighCSR_Change*LowConsumerSensitivity) is statistically different across the HighAQ=1 and LowAQ=1 
partitions (difference of 0.064, p-value of 0.01). 
 
41 In Table 7, models (5) and (6) provide results consistent with models (3) and (4), after controlling for firms 
with CSR divestments (LowCSR_Change=1). 
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investment in CSR is positively associated with future profitability. This is consistent with 
the logic that high-quality financial reporting disciplines managers to make investments in 
CSR that benefit shareholders. On the contrary, there is a negative relation between 
investment in CSR and future profitability for firms with low-quality financial reporting. 
Further analysis shows that this negative relation for firms with low-quality financial 
reporting is exacerbated in low consumer sensitivity firms. This suggests that in settings 
where CSR has a tenuous link to financial performance, financial reporting quality plays an 
important role in disciplining managers to avoid inefficient CSR investments. 
 In recent years and particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, there has been an 
increased focus on CSR. There has been much theoretical debate on whether CSR is a profit-
motivated investment that enhances firms’ future financial performance or a distribution of 
shareholder wealth for pursuit of managers’ own interests, and while many studies have 
examined the valuation implications of CSR, this is still very much an open question in the 
literature. Given the increasing importance of CSR in the economy and the ongoing debate 
on its valuation implications, I view this study as an important contribution to the debate. 
Overall, my results suggest that higher-quality financial reporting improves CSR investment 
efficiency by mitigating moral hazard, resulting in an investment in CSR that benefits 
shareholders by improving future financial performance. Thus, I identify one channel, the 
disciplining role of financial reporting quality, which affects whether CSR results in value 
creation.
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A shows the sample descriptive statistics. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics by HighCSR_Change, an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in 
the top decile of firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. The significance of the difference in means in Panel B is based on a t-test. 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 25% Median 75% N Mean Median N Mean Median N Difference in Mean
CSR_Level 1.54 2.06 0 1 2 10,107   3.70 3 952      1.32 1 9,155   ***
CSR_Change 0.12 0.71 0 0 0 10,107   1.58 1 952      -0.03 0 9,155   ***
AQ -0.045 0.038 -0.057 -0.033 -0.021 10,107   -0.044 -0.031 952      -0.046 -0.033 9,155   
AQ_Rank 0.55 0.29 0.30 0.60 0.80 10,107   0.59 0.60 952      0.55 0.50 9,155   ***
HighAQ 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 10,107   0.13 0 952      0.10 0 9,155   ***
MiddleAQ 0.80 0.40 1 1 1 10,107   0.79 1 952      0.80 1 9,155   
LowAQ 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 10,107   0.08 0 952      0.10 0 9,155   *
Overi 0.55 0.24 0.35 0.55 0.75 10,107   0.52 0.50 952      0.55 0.55 9,155   ***
HighOveri 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 10,107   0.41 0 952      0.46 0 9,155   ***
Nibex t+1 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.10 10,107   0.06 0.06 952      0.05 0.06 9,155   **
Nibex t 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.10 10,107   0.06 0.06 952      0.05 0.06 9,155   ***
LowConsumerSensitivity 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 10,107   0.50 0 952      0.52 1 9,155   
Cash 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.14 10,107   0.11 0.06 952      0.10 0.06 9,155   
CFO 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.14 10,107   0.10 0.10 952      0.08 0.09 9,155   ***
Lev 1.43 2.47 0.52 1.04 1.80 10,107   1.57 1.20 952      1.42 1.03 9,155   *
MTB 3.38 3.26 1.72 2.58 3.99 10,107   3.81 3.06 952      3.33 2.54 9,155   ***
Sales Growth 0.13 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.19 10,107   0.13 0.09 952      0.13 0.09 9,155   
Size 7.48 1.52 6.38 7.43 8.48 10,107   8.21 8.21 952      7.41 7.34 9,155   ***
σCFO 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.09 10,107   0.07 0.05 952      0.07 0.05 9,155   
σ Sales 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.17 10,107   0.13 0.10 952      0.14 0.10 9,155   
Op. Cycle 4.64 0.64 4.32 4.71 5.03 10,107   4.60 4.68 952      4.64 4.72 9,155   
Losses 0.79 1.28 0 0 1 10,107   0.78 0 952      0.79 0 9,155   
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A Panel B
Full Sample HighCSR_Change =1 HighCSR_Change =0
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Table 2.  Correlations 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Above (Below) the Diagonal for the sample. 
Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
CSR_Level CSR_Change HighCSR_Change AQ AQ_Rank HighAQ LowAQ Overi HighOveri Nibex t+1 Nibex t LowConsumerSensitivity
CSR_Level 1 0.30 0.34 0.11 0.10 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.08 -0.08
CSR_Change 0.28 1 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.01
HighCSR_Change 0.32 0.63 1 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02
AQ 0.12 0.02 0.02 1 0.81 0.31 -0.75 -0.35 -0.31 0.24 0.29 -0.03
AQ_Rank 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.97 1 0.52 -0.52 -0.37 -0.33 0.16 0.18 -0.04
HighAQ 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.51 0.52 1 -0.11 -0.17 -0.16 0.04 0.05 -0.03
LowAQ -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.50 -0.52 -0.11 1 0.24 0.21 -0.18 -0.21 0.01
Overi -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.36 -0.37 -0.17 0.24 1 0.85 0.08 0.10 0.02
HighOveri -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.33 -0.33 -0.16 0.21 0.86 1 0.07 0.09 0.01
Nibex t+1 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.02 -0.13 0.18 0.15 1 0.62 -0.05
Nibex t 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.12 0.23 0.19 0.71 1 -0.04
LowConsumerSensitivity -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.08 1
Correlations
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Table 3. Determinants of investment in CSR 
This table presents the results of the probit estimation of Eq. (2): 
(2) 
ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܽݏℎ௜ ,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ିଵ + ߚଷܮ݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସܯܶܤ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚହ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ିଵ +
ߚ଺ܣܳ௜,௧ିଵ +  ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ +  ߝ௜,௧     
The dependent variable, HighCSR_Change, is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of 
firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. All other variables are as described in Appendix A.  
Z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES HighCSR_Change HighCSR_Change HighCSR_Change
Cash 0.6470*** 0.3125* 0.3215*
(4.14) (1.72) (1.76)
CFO 0.4193** 0.6767*** 0.6738***
(2.14) (3.24) (3.24)
Lev -0.0331*** -0.0362*** -0.0358***
(-3.15) (-3.14) (-3.09)
MTB 0.0249*** 0.0283*** 0.0281***
(4.14) (4.06) (4.03)
Sales Growth -0.0859 -0.0700 -0.0684
(-1.01) (-0.72) (-0.71)
AQ -0.6934
(-0.95)
Size 0.2087*** 0.2587*** 0.2599***
(15.17) (15.94) (15.91)
σCFO 0.4832 0.4173 0.2145
(1.50) (1.26) (0.55)
σ Sales 0.3265* 0.1969 0.1908
(1.89) (1.05) (1.02)
Op. Cycle -0.0296 -0.0872** -0.0860**
(-1.01) (-2.01) (-1.98)
Losses 0.0441** 0.0338* 0.0308*
(2.55) (1.93) (1.74)
Observations 10,107 10,068 10,068
Fixed Effects None Ind and Y Ind and Y
Clustered SEs Firm Firm Firm
Pseudo R-squared 0.0476 0.123 0.123
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Table 4. Relation between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR 
This table presents the results of the probit estimation of Eq. (3): 
(3) ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܣܳ_ܴܽ݊݇௜,௧ + ߚଶܣܳ_ܴܽ݊݇௜,௧ ∗ ܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ + ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ +
∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ 
The dependent variable, HighCSR_Change, is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of 
firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. AQ_Rank is the decile rank of AQ, ranked by year, where 
AQ is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
during the years t-4 to t, multiplied by negative one. HighOveri is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with 
above median Overi, and 0 otherwise, where Overi is the average of the decile rank of Cash and the decile rank 
of (Lev*-1), both ranked by year. All other variables are as described in Appendix A. Z-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. The marginal effect of the interaction term is calculated as the cross-partial 
derivative with respect to the two interacted variables (Ai and Norton, 2003). To assess the statistical 
significance of the marginal effect, the Z-statistic is calculated using the delta method (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
(1)
VARIABLES HighCSR_Change
AQ_Rank 0.1429
(1.41)
AQ_Rank  * HighOveri -0.2693*
(-1.94)
HighOveri 0.2607***
(2.96)
MTB 0.0186***
(3.61)
Size 0.2539***
(15.52)
σCFO 0.4021
(1.19)
σ Sales 0.1975
(1.05)
Op. Cycle -0.1000**
(-2.33)
Losses 0.0060
(0.36)
Marginal Effect of: AQ_Rank  * HighOveri -0.0398*
(Z-Statistic) (-1.74)
Observations 10,068
Fixed Effects Ind and Y
Clustered SEs Firm
Pseudo R-squared 0.120
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Table 5. Relation between financial reporting quality and investment in CSR 
This table presents the results of the probit estimation of Eq. (4):   
(4) ܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܪ݅݃ℎܱݒ݁ݎ݅௜,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ିଵ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ 
The dependent variable, HighCSR_Change, is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of 
firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. HighAQ is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years 
in the top decile of AQ_Rank, 0 otherwise. MiddleAQ is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the 
second through ninth deciles of AQ_Rank, 0 otherwise. LowAQ is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years 
in the bottom decile of AQ_Rank, 0 otherwise. AQ_Rank is the decile rank of AQ, ranked by year, where AQ is 
the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model during 
the years t-4 to t, multiplied by negative one. HighOveri is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with above 
median Overi, and 0 otherwise, where Overi is the average of the decile rank of Cash and the decile rank of 
(Lev*-1), both ranked by year. All other variables are as described in Appendix A. Z-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
HighAQ =1 MiddleAQ =1 LowAQ =1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES HighCSR_Change HighCSR_Change HighCSR_Change HighCSR_Change
HighOveri 0.1101*** -0.1320 0.1261*** 0.4281***
(2.64) (-0.86) (2.71) (2.72)
MTB 0.0186*** 0.0520** 0.0200*** 0.0161
(3.63) (2.15) (3.34) (1.07)
Size 0.2543*** 0.2838*** 0.2585*** 0.2343***
(15.71) (5.49) (13.66) (3.77)
σCFO 0.4455 3.3110* 0.3220 -0.2034
(1.38) (1.90) (0.73) (-0.32)
σ Sales 0.1643 -0.1859 0.2125 -0.5611
(0.90) (-0.25) (1.00) (-1.02)
Op. Cycle -0.1017** 0.1097 -0.1141** -0.2722**
(-2.38) (0.76) (-2.22) (-2.36)
Losses 0.0047 -0.0799 0.0225 -0.0554
(0.28) (-0.82) (1.15) (-1.30)
Observations 10,068 897 8,034 805
Fixed Effects Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y
Clustered SEs Firm Firm Firm Firm
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 0.177 0.124 0.117
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Table 6. Investment in CSR and future financial performance 
This table presents the results of the ordinary-least-squares estimation of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6):                           
(5) ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ାଵ 
(6) ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ + ߚଷܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ +
ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ାଵ   
The dependent variable, Nibexi,t+1, is net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets. 
HighCSR_Change is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of firms each year ranked 
by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. LowCSR_Change is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the bottom 
decile of firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. All other variables are as described in Appendix 
A.  
T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
HighAQ =1 LowAQ=1 HighAQ=1 LowAQ=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1
Nibex t 0.5610*** 0.5609*** 0.8793*** 0.4037*** 0.8745*** 0.4039***
(28.58) (28.58) (11.80) (9.11) (11.79) (9.09)
HighCSR_Change 0.0040 0.0041 0.0064* -0.0321** 0.0073* -0.0319**
(1.32) (1.36) (1.71) (-2.05) (1.91) (-2.02)
LowCSR_Change 0.0015 0.0105** 0.0024
(0.52) (2.18) (0.16)
Lev -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0014 0.0002 0.0014
(-1.08) (-1.08) (0.37) (0.61) (0.29) (0.61)
Size 0.0015** 0.0015* 0.0017 0.0144*** 0.0016 0.0143***
(2.00) (1.94) (1.23) (3.63) (1.16) (3.58)
σCFO -0.0200 -0.0201 -0.0126 0.0776 -0.0105 0.0776
(-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.16) (1.40) (-0.13) (1.40)
σ Sales 0.0039 0.0039 -0.0324 0.0317 -0.0325 0.0316
(0.41) (0.41) (-1.53) (0.87) (-1.54) (0.87)
Op. Cycle -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0048 0.0025 -0.0050 0.0025
(-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.25) (0.24) (-1.31) (0.25)
Losses -0.0099*** -0.0099*** 0.0039 -0.0170*** 0.0038 -0.0170***
(-8.85) (-8.85) (1.03) (-4.52) (0.99) (-4.51)
Difference in HighCSR_Change  Coefficient 
P-Value
Difference in LowCSR_Change  Coefficient 
P-Value
Observations 10,107 10,107 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004
Adjusted R-squared 0.4177 0.4176 0.5420 0.3734 0.5433 0.3728
Fixed Effects Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y
Clustered SEs Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
0.0081
0.5890
(3)-(4) (5)-(6)
0.0385** 0.0392**
0.0145 0.0136
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Table 7. Investment in CSR and future financial performance 
This table presents the results of the ordinary-least-squares estimation of Eq. (7) and Eq. (8):                           
(7) ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ =
ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧+ ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗
ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧+ ߚ଺ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ + ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ାଵ 
(8) ܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ାଵ =
ߚ଴ + ߚଵܾܰ݅݁ݔ௜,௧ + ߚଶܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧+ ߚଷܪ݅݃ℎܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗ ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ +
ߚସܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃ ௜݁,௧ + ߚହܮ݋ݓܥܴܵ_ܥℎܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ∗ ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜,௧+ ߚ଺ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ + ∑ߛ௝ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௜,௧ +
ߟூ +  ߮௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ାଵ  
The dependent variable, Nibexi,t+1, is net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets. 
HighCSR_Change is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of firms each year ranked 
by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. LowCSR_Change is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the bottom 
decile of firms each year ranked by CSR_Change, 0 otherwise. LowConsumerSensitivity is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for firms in industries classified as low consumer sensitivity, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
as described in Appendix A. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
HighAQ =1 LowAQ =1 HighAQ =1 LowAQ=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1 Nibex t+1
Nibex t 0.5609*** 0.5608*** 0.8788*** 0.4022*** 0.8741*** 0.4028***
(28.62) (28.61) (11.77) (9.13) (11.76) (9.12)
HighCSR_Change 0.0121*** 0.0125*** 0.0088* -0.0004 0.0096** -0.0010
(3.15) (3.18) (1.88) (-0.03) (2.03) (-0.06)
HighCSR_Change  * LowConsumerSensitivity -0.0164*** -0.0167*** -0.0053 -0.0598** -0.0052 -0.0583**
(-2.85) (-2.88) (-0.75) (-2.06) (-0.73) (-1.99)
LowCSR_Change 0.0030 0.0104 -0.0097
(0.77) (1.47) (-0.40)
LowCSR_Change  * LowConsumerSensitivity -0.0029 0.0002 0.0212
(-0.53) (0.02) (0.72)
LowConsumerSensitivity -0.0263* -0.0260* -0.0469** -0.1175* -0.0360* -0.1172*
(-1.72) (-1.71) (-2.32) (-1.77) (-1.81) (-1.76)
Lev -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0014 0.0002 0.0015
(-1.09) (-1.09) (0.33) (0.59) (0.25) (0.61)
Size 0.0015** 0.0015** 0.0017 0.0144*** 0.0016 0.0141***
(2.04) (1.97) (1.24) (3.65) (1.17) (3.51)
σCFO -0.0197 -0.0197 -0.0145 0.0729 -0.0123 0.0718
(-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.18) (1.31) (-0.16) (1.29)
σ Sales 0.0036 0.0037 -0.0322 0.0309 -0.0323 0.0305
(0.38) (0.40) (-1.52) (0.84) (-1.52) (0.83)
Op. Cycle -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0047 0.0021 -0.0050 0.0023
(-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.23) (0.21) (-1.29) (0.22)
Losses -0.0098*** -0.0098*** 0.0039 -0.0169*** 0.0037 -0.0170***
(-8.85) (-8.85) (1.02) (-4.54) (0.98) (-4.55)
Difference in HighCSR_Change  Coefficient 
P-Value
Difference in (HighCSR_Change  +  HighCSR_Change  * LowConsumerSensitivity ) Coefficient 
P-Value
Observations 10,107 10,107 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004
Adjusted R-squared 0.4181 0.4181 0.5417 0.3753 0.5425 0.3743
Fixed Effects Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y Ind and Y
Clustered SEs Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
0.0637**
0.0103
0.0637***
0.0089
(3)-(4) (5)-(6)
0.0092 0.0106
0.5815 0.5199
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Definition Source
CSR_Level CSR level The firm's sum of CSR strength scores from the Community, Diversity, Employee 
Relations, and Environment categories.
KLD Research 
and Analytics 
CSR_Change CSR change The firm's change in CSR strength scores, calculated as: 
CSR_Level t  -  CSR_Level t-1 .
KLD Research 
and Analytics 
HighCSR_Change High CSR_Change Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of firms each year ranked 
by CSR_Change , 0 otherwise.
KLD Research 
and Analytics 
LowCSR_Change Low CSR_Change Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the bottom decile of firms each year 
ranked by CSR_Change , 0 otherwise.
KLD Research 
and Analytics 
AQ Accruals Quality The standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model during the years t-4 to t, multiplied by negative one. The model 
is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows 
from operations plus the change in revenue and PPE. All variables are scaled by 
average total assets. The model is an annual, cross-sectional estimation for each 
industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and French 
(1997) 48-industry classification.
Compustat
AQ_Rank Accruals Quality decile 
rank
The decile rank of AQ , ranked by year. Compustat
HighAQ High Accruals Quality Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the top decile of AQ_Rank , 0 otherwise. Compustat
MiddleAQ Middle Accruals Quality Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the second through ninth deciles of 
AQ_Rank , 0 otherwise.
Compustat
LowAQ Low Accruals Quality Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years in the bottom decile of AQ_Rank , 0 
otherwise.
Compustat
Overi Likelihood of Over-
Investment
The average of the decile rank of Cash  and the decile rank of (Lev *-1), both ranked 
by year. Leverage is multiplied by minus one before ranking so that both variables 
are increasing in the likelihood of over-investment.
Compustat
HighOveri Above median likelihood of 
Over-Investment
Indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with above median Overi , and 0 otherwise. Compustat
Nibex t+1 Net Income before 
extraordinary items
Net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets at year t+1. Compustat
Nibex t Net Income before 
extraordinary items
Net income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets at year t. Compustat
LowConsumerSensitivity Low consumer sensitivity Indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in industries classified as low consumer 
sensitivity, and 0 otherwise. To classify industries by consumer sensitivity, the 
median advertising expense to sales is obtained for each Fama and French (1997) 
industry using the Compustat population from 1992-2009. Those industries with 
below-median industry-median advertising expense to sales are classified as low 
consumer sensitivity.
Compustat
Cash Cash Cash scaled by average total assets. Compustat
CFO Cash flow from operations Cash flow from operations (calculated using the indirect method as described in 
Section 4) scaled by average total assets.
Compustat
Lev Leverage Total liabilities divided by book equity. Compustat
MTB Market to Book ratio Market value of equity divided by book equity. Compustat
Sales Growth Sales growth The ratio of change in sales to lagged sales. Compustat
Size Size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat
σCFO Cash Flow Volatility The standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets, 
over (t–4, t).
Compustat
σ Sales Sales Volatility The standard deviation of sales scaled by average total assets, over (t–4, t). Compustat
Op. Cycle Operating Cycle The natural logarithm of the length of the firm’s operating cycle, measured as the sum 
of days accounts receivable and days inventory.
Compustat
Losses Loss History The number of years the firm reports a loss in net income before extraordinary items, 
over (t–4, t).
Compustat
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Appendix B. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Performance 
This table presents a summary of the CSR strength categories included in the KLD Research and Analytics 
database.  The data are for all firms included in the KLD Research and Analytics database from 1991-2009 that 
can be linked to CRSP and Compustat data. Within each of the strength categories (Community, Corporate 
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product), KLD defines a set of 
potential strengths and assigns a value of one if the strength exists, and zero otherwise. Panel A presents the 
mean, median, and maximum strength scores by category. Panel B presents the mean strength scores by 
category and industry for the Community, Diversity, Employee Relations, and Environment categories. Panel B 
also presents the mean year-to-year change in total strengths. Industry definitions are taken from Barth et al. 
(2005). 
Panel A: 
 
Panel B: 
Category Sub-Categories
Mean 
Strength
Median 
Strength
Max 
Strength
Community (1) Charitable Giving, (2) Innovative Giving, (3) Non-U.S. Charitable Giving, (4) Support for Education, 
(5) Support for Housing, (6) Volunteer Programs, and (7) Other Strengths
0.22 0 5
Corporate Governance (1) Compensation, (2) Ownership, (3) Political Accountability, (4) Transparency, and (5) Other 
Strengths
0.17 0 3
Diversity (1) Board of Directors, (2) CEO, (3) Employment of the Disabled, (4) Promotion, (5) Women & Minority 
Contracting, (6) Work/Life Benefits , (7) Gay & Lesbian Policies, and (8) Other Strengths
0.67 0 7
Employee Relations (1) Health and Safety, (2) Retirement Benefits , (3) Union Relations, (4) Cash Profit Sharing, (5) Employee 
Involvement, and (6) Other Strengths
0.34 0 5
Environment (1) Beneficial Products & Services, (2) Clean Energy, (3) Pollution Prevention, (4) Recycling, and (5) 
Other Strengths 
0.17 0 4
Human Rights (1) Labor Rights, (2) Relations with Indigenous Peoples, and (3) Other Strengths 0.01 0 2
Product (1) Benefits  the Economically Disadvantaged, (2) Quality, (3) R&D/Innovation, and (4) Other Strengths 0.09 0 3
Total Strengths 1.65 1 22
CSR Strengths by Category
Mean Change in Strengths
Industry Community Diversity Employee Relations Environment Total Strengths Total Strengths
Mining/Construction 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.74 0.09
Food 0.42 1.16 0.42 0.29 2.29 0.16
Textiles/Print/Publish 0.18 0.69 0.36 0.32 1.55 0.11
Chemicals 0.30 0.72 0.55 0.47 2.04 0.15
Pharmaceuticals 0.25 0.84 0.41 0.16 1.65 0.13
Extractive 0.21 0.25 0.56 0.23 1.25 0.10
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc 0.34 0.56 0.47 0.19 1.56 0.11
Manf:Metal 0.09 0.19 0.52 0.36 1.16 0.08
Manf:Machinery 0.14 0.32 0.34 0.25 1.04 0.08
Manf:ElectricalEqpt 0.20 0.52 0.40 0.25 1.37 0.09
Manf:TransportEqpt 0.22 0.68 0.71 0.37 1.98 0.17
Manf:Instruments 0.14 0.59 0.27 0.21 1.21 0.10
Manf:Misc. 0.50 0.70 0.29 0.06 1.56 0.08
Computers 0.15 0.87 0.45 0.14 1.62 0.12
Transportation 0.17 0.73 0.35 0.05 1.30 0.09
Utilities 0.24 0.71 0.39 0.51 1.85 0.11
Retail:Wholesale 0.05 0.38 0.16 0.08 0.67 0.07
Retail:Misc. 0.23 0.93 0.25 0.07 1.49 0.10
Retail:Restaurant 0.10 0.97 0.22 0.11 1.40 0.12
Financial 0.43 0.79 0.27 0.01 1.51 0.11
Insurance/RealEstate 0.04 0.25 0.11 0.01 0.41 0.03
Services 0.03 0.59 0.13 0.03 0.78 0.08
Total for all industries 0.22 0.67 0.34 0.17 1.39 0.10
CSR Strengths by Category and Industry
Mean Strength
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Appendix C. Monte Carlo randomization test methodology42 
C.1 Monte Carlo randomization test methodology with a linear model. 
 In a linear specification of Eq. (4), Monte Carlo randomization could be employed to 
test the statistical significance of the difference in the HighOveri coefficients across sample 
partitions. In a linear specification, this randomization procedure would test how frequently 
the actual observed difference in the coefficients across partitions would occur randomly.  
 To execute this test for a linear specification of Eq. (4), I would use the following 
procedure. First, I would compute the actual observed test statistic (Diff) as the difference in 
the estimated HighOveri coefficient in partition A (LowAQ=1) minus the estimated 
HighOveri coefficient in partition B (HighAQ=1), where each coefficient was obtained from 
the estimation of Eq. (4) on the actual sample partitions. Second, from the original 
observations in the dataset, I would randomly assign n1 (the original number of HighAQ 
observations, i.e., 1,004) observations without replacement to a random HighAQ* partition 
and randomly assign n2 (the original number of LowAQ observations, i.e., 1,004) 
observations without replacement to a random LowAQ* partition. Third, I would estimate Eq. 
(4) for each of the randomly assigned sample partitions and compute the difference in the 
HighOveri coefficient estimates across the randomly assigned sample partitions (Diff*). I 
would next repeat this process 1,000 times. The resulting p-value would be calculated as the 
proportion of the 1,000 sample permutations where Diff*>Diff. 
C.2 Monte Carlo randomization test methodology with a nonlinear model. 
 In the nonlinear probit specification of Eq. (4), the marginal effect of the HighOveri 
variable is conditional on the independent variables, unlike the marginal effect in the linear 
specification. As such, for the nonlinear specification of Eq. (4), I employ a Monte Carlo 
randomization procedure to test the statistical significance of the difference in the marginal 
effects of the HighOveri coefficients across sample partitions. This randomization procedure 
tests how frequently the actual observed difference in the marginal effects of the coefficients 
across partitions would occur randomly. 
 I use the following procedure. First, I compute the actual observed test statistic 
(MEff_Diff) as the difference in the estimated marginal effect of the HighOveri coefficient in 
partition A (LowAQ=1) minus the estimated marginal effect of the HighOveri coefficient in 
partition B (HighAQ=1). Each marginal effect is obtained from the probit estimation of Eq. 
(4) on the actual sample partitions and represents the partial derivative of the probit function 
with respect to HighOveri, evaluated at the mean values of all variables. Second, from the 
original observations in my dataset, I randomly assign n1 (the original number of HighAQ 
observations, i.e., 1,004) observations without replacement to a random HighAQ* partition 
and randomly assign n2 (the original number of LowAQ observations, i.e., 1,004) 
observations without replacement to a random LowAQ* partition. Third, I estimate Eq. (4) 
for each of the randomly assigned sample partitions and compute the difference in the 
marginal effects of the HighOveri coefficient estimates across the randomly assigned sample 
partitions (MEff_Diff*). Each marginal effect is obtained from the probit estimation of Eq. 
(4) on the randomly assigned sample partitions and represents the partial derivative of the 
probit function with respect to HighOveri, evaluated at the mean values of all variables. I 
                                                             
42 The randomization procedure is adapted from procedures implemented in Owens (2011) and Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011). 
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next repeat this process 1,000 times. The resulting p-value is calculated as the proportion of 
the 1,000 sample permutations where MEff_Diff*> MEff_Diff.  
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Appendix D. Interaction Effects in Probit Model 
This figure presents graphical analysis of the interaction effect of the probit model estimated in Table 4. The 
figure presents the marginal effect of the interaction term calculated as the cross-partial derivative with respect 
to the two interacted variables in accordance with Ai and Norton (2003). 
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